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1 Introduction
A growing literature attributes the importance of investment specic technological change
to long run growth (see Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000); Whelan (2003)). Investment specic
technological change refers to technological change which reduces the real price of capital
goods. Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000) show that once the falling price of real capital goods
is taken into account, this explains most of the observed growth in output in the US, with
relatively little being left over to be explained by total factor productivity. Other authors,
such as Gort et al. (1999) distinguish between equipment specic technological change and
structure specic technological change. These authors show that 15% of US economic growth
rate can be attributed to structure specic technological change in the post war period, while
equipment-specic technological progress accounts for 37% of US growth. This implies 52%
of US economic growth can be attributed to technological progress in new capital goods.1
However, investment specic technological change in these models is typically is assumed to
be an exogenous process.
In a series of recent papers, Hu¤man (2007, 2008) builds upon this literature by explicitly
modeling the mechanism through which the real price of capital falls when investment spe-
cic technological occurs. Such models are characterized by endogenous investment specic
technological change. In Hu¤man (2008), the changing relative price of capital is driven by
research activity, undertaken by labor e¤ort. Higher research spending in one period lowers
the cost of producing the capital good in the next period.2 Agents equate the utility costs
of raising employment in research with the benets of doing so. The return to increasing
research employment is the discounted value of the reduction in the real cost of investment in
future periods. Extra research employment also leads to higher future consumption because
of the reduction in cost of investing in capital goods because of the research.3 Investment
specic technological change is thus endogenous in the model, since employment can either
be undertaken in a research sector or a production sector.
The specication of investment specic technological change in the above literature how-
ever has not incorporated two important empirical determinants: public capital and the
e¤ects of capital deepening. For instance, it is well known that the public sector can be a
1See Greenwood and Krusell (2007) for a careful discussion of growth accounting in the presence of
investment specic technological change. Cummins and Violante (2002) show that "technological gaps", i.e.,
the comparative productivity of a new machine relative to an average machine, can explain the dynamics of
investments in new technologies as well as returns to human capital.
2Krusell (1998) also builds a model in which the decline in the relative price of equipment capital is a
result of R&D decisions at the level of private rms.
3However, if the utility cost of raising research employment is high, then all employment would be devoted
to production of output, and there would be no research employment. There would be no output growth,
and the economy converges to a steady state with constant levels of output.
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source of manufacturing investment goods which in turn a¤ects growth (see Schmitz,
2001). The point of departure of this paper is that we allow the stock of public capital (or
public infrastructure stock) to directly a¤ect the future real price of capital goods through
investment specic technological change, and therefore balanced growth.4 In particular, we
extend the environment in Hu¤man (2008) to allow public capital to directly a¤ect invest-
ment specic technological change. Our setup also allows investment specic technological
change to enhance the accumulation of public capital.5 Since the public capital stock is
nanced by distortionary taxes, we allow a role for factor income taxes in generating en-
dogenous growth and raising welfare in the presence of investment specic technological
change. This generates several interesting optimal factor income taxation results.
Second, Greenwood et al. (1997) show that the real price of capital equipment in the
US since 1950 - has fallen alongside a rise in the investment-GNP ratio. Greenwood et
al. (1997, p. 342) say: "The negative comovement between price and quantity.....can be in-
terpreted as evidence that there has been signicant technological change in the production
of new equipment. Technological advances have made equipment less expensive, triggering
increases in the accumulation of equipment both in the short and long run." Given this,
we assume that investment specic technological change also depends on aggregate capital
accumulation. In particular, we assume that the aggregate capital-output ratio exerts a pos-
itive contribution on reductions in the future price of real capital goods because of aggregate
investment activity. Our model can be therefore seen as providing an endogenous channel
through which aggregate investment activity also enhances investment specic technological
change.
Our baseline model has two sectors. The rst sector produces a nal good, using private
capital, and two types of labor activities. One type of labor activity is devoted to nal good
production, and the other to research which directly reduces the real price of capital goods in
the next period. The second sector captures the e¤ect of public capital and research activity
on reducing the real price of capital goods explicitly and not through the shadow price of
4Our paper is related to two strands of the literature on scal policy and long run growth in the neo-
classical framework. Barro (1990), for instance, models public services as a ow. Futagami, Morita, and
Shibata (1993), allow public capital to accumulate. However, in the large literature on public capital and
its impact on growth spawned by these papers, the public input, whether it is modeled as a ow or a stock,
doesnt directly inuence the real price of capital goods. For instance, in Ott and Turnovsky (2006) - who
use the ow of public services to model the public input - and Chen (2006), Fischer and Turnovsky (1998)
- who use stock of public capital - the shadow price of private capital is a function of public and private
capital. In our model, public capital a¤ects the real price o¤ capital explicitly. This means that the public
input a¤ects future output through its e¤ect on both future investment specic technological change, as well
as future private capital accumulation.
5For instance, providing better infrastructure today reduces the cost of providing public capital in the
future.
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capital In the planners problem, we assume that public capital is nanced by a proportional
income tax. We focus on the balanced growth path (BGP). We show that the balanced
growth path is stable under a reasonable restriction. We characterize the growth and welfare
maximizing tax rates. The growth and welfare maximizing tax rate are determined by the
relative importance of the public capital output ratio vis-a-vis the private capital output
ratio in the investment specic technological change function. The implication of this is that
if a planner was to choose the tax rate, he could maximize long run growth as long as the
tax rate equals the relative contribution of public capital to investment specic technological
change. We show that welfare maximizing tax rate is smaller than the growth maximizing
tax rate.
We then decentralize the planners allocations. We assume that public capital is nanced
by distortionary factor income taxes on capital and labor income. Interestingly, we show that
innitely many combinations of factor income taxes can replicate the planners allocations
based on an optimal tax rule. The equilibrium factor income tax mix is therefore indetermi-
nate. Intuitively, indeterminacy occurs because for any given tax rate on one factor income,
changing the other factor income tax produces a di¤erent La¤er curve, with the optimal
tax rule now satised under the new La¤er curve. The implication of indeterminacy in our
model is that it gives the planner the exibility to choose policy rules from an innitely large
set. We also show that indeterminacy remains robust to two natural variants of the model,
i.e., in allowing just a single type of labor activity to augment nal good production, and
allowing agents to participate in the credit market.
We then incorporate administrative costs to tax collection. We show that accounting for
administrative costs reduces the set of optimal feasible tax mix of the planner. In fact the size
of this set shrinks as the convexity of the administrative costs increases and a unique factor
income tax mix emerges as the only feasible solution. We also show that when administrative
costs increase with increases in the tax rate there is a level reduction in the growth rate for all
tax rates, and a lower growth maximizing tax rate. The indeterminacy in the factor income
tax mix, and its robustness, is the main result of our paper.
From a growth-tax policy standpoint, we show that reducing the tax on labor, while
increasing the tax on capital by an equi-proportionate amount, reduces growth marginally.
However, a revenue neutral change - which takes into account the elasticity adjusted factor
income tax changes - a rule that we characterize analytically increases growth in comparison
to the equi-proportionate case. This result holds for large changes in the labor income tax.
However, if we reduce the tax on capital, the change required in terms of a revenue neutral
increase in the labor income tax is less than the equi-proportionate case. Hence, a reduction
in the tax on labor increases growth if we compare the equi-proportionate case to the revenue
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neutral case. These results contrast with the case where we increase the tax on capital. Our
numerical results are consistent with some of the results in this literature that the growth
e¤ects of changes in the capital income tax rate are not large (see Stokey and Rebelo (1995)).6
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the baseline model. Sec-
tion 3 shows that our indeterminacy result is robust to two variants of the baseline model.
Section 4 develops the model with administrative costs. Section 5 conducts numerous policy
experiments. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Baseline Model
Consider an economy that is populated by identical representative agents, who at each period
t, derive utility from consumption of the nal good Ct and leisure (1   nt).7 The term nt
represents the fraction of time spent at time t in employment. The discounted life-time
utility, U; of an innitely lived representative agent is given by
U =
1P
t=0
t[logCt + log(1  nt)]. (1)
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the period-wise discount factor. There is no population growth in
the economy. The nal good is produced by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
with a constant returns to scale technology. The production function is given by
Yt = AK
1
t n
2
1t (mn2t)
3 ; (2)
A > 0 is the productivity parameter. Output is produced using capital, Kt; and two di¤erent
types of labor activity, n1t and n2t, both of which are essential to production. The rst part
of labor input, n1, is devoted to direct production of nal output. The second part of
agent labor e¤ort, n2; can be thought of as a more specialized labor input required for
research and development which a¤ects the level of investment specic technological change,
Z. In particular, we assume that a representative rm employs a fraction, m 2 (0; 1); of
6In the model with administrative costs, our policy experiments show that when we have concave admin-
istrative costs, it is easier to increase the tax on capital to re-establish optimal growth rates, compared to
the model with convex administrative costs. We also show that there is virtually no change in growth or
welfare for a signicant increase in the tax on capital that matches a given reduction in the tax on labor.
From a policy standpoint, this suggests that it may be easier to tax capital at a higher rate without changing
growth or welfare when administrative costs are concave, when the tax on labor is reduced.
7See http://www.isid.ac.in/~cghate/chetanresearch.html for a detailed technical appendix of this paper.
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n2 in nal production.8 The remaining fraction of n2 not used directly in production of
the nal good is devoted to research e¤ort which augments the level of investment specic
technological change (Z) in the subsequent time period.9 Thus, n2; is analogous to the
research employment in Hu¤man (2008) that goes into raising Z:10 In other words, the
higher is the fraction of n2 allocated for research e¤ort, the higher is the future level of Z.
The total supply of labor by an agent at time t is given by the following
nt  n1t + n2t: (3)
The shares of capital Kt, n1t and n2t in nal goods production are given by i 2 (0; 1); i =
1; 2; 3 respectively. The assumption of constant returns to scale in this model ensures that
they add up to unity, that is, 1 + 2 + 3 = 1.11
Private capital accumulation grows according to the standard law of motion augmented
by investment specic technological change,
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + ItZt; (4)
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the rate of depreciation of capital and It represents the amount of
total output allocated towards private investment at time period t. Zt represents investment-
specic technological change. The higher the value of Zt; the lower is the cost of accumulating
capital in the future. Hence Zt also can be viewed as the inverse of the price of per-unit
private capital at time period t. Thus at every period t, Zt augments investment It. ItZt thus
represents the e¤ective amount of investment driving capital accumulation in time period
t+ 1.
In addition to labor time deployed by the representative rm towards R&D, the public
capital stock, G; plays a crucial role in lowering the price of capital accumulation. Typically,
the public input is seen as directly a¤ecting nal production either as a stock or a ow (e.g.,
see Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993), Chen (2006), Fischer and Turnovsky (1997, 1998),
and Eicher and Turnovsky (2000)). Instead, we assume that the public input facilitates
investment specic technological change. This means that the public input a¤ects future
output through future private capital accumulation directly. In the above literature, the
public input a¤ects current output directly.
8The results of the model are qualitatively similar when agents choose m optimally:
9In Section (3), we assume that only n1 enters in nal good production, as in Hu¤man (2008). This does
not change the results qualitatively.
10Other papers in the literature - such as Reis (2011) - also assume two types of labor a¤ecting production.
In Reis (2011), one form of labor is the standard labor input, while the other labor input is entrepreneurial
labor. Our analysis considers n2 as quality enhancing labor.
11In Hu¤man, n2 doesnt enter into the production of nal goods directly.
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We assume that in every period, public investment is funded by a constant proportional
tax,  2 (0; 1); on income. We assume that public capital evolves according to
Gt+1 = (1  )Gt + Igt Zt; (5)
where Gt+1 denotes the public capital stock in t + 1, and I
g
t denotes the level of public
investment made by the government in time period t. As mentioned in the introduction, we
assume that Zt augments I
g
t in the same way as It since it enables us to analyze the joint
endogeneity of Z and G: To derive the balanced growth path, we further assume that the
period wise depreciation rate  2 [0; 1] is same for both private capital and public capital.
The government budget constraint is given by
Igt = Yt; (6)
where  2 (0; 1) is the tax rate imposed by the planner to nance public capital.
2.1 Investment Specic Technological Change
To capture the e¤ect of public capital on research and development, we assume that Z grows
according to the following law of motion,
Zt+1 = B((1  m)n2t)Zt
(
Gt
Yt 1

Kt
Yt 1
1 )1 
: (7)
Here, B stands for an exogenously xed scale productivity parameter, 1   m represents
the fraction of labor input, n2t; devoted towards R&D, and  2 (0; 1) captures the impact
of public investments on investment specic technological change. We assume that the
parameters,  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1), where  stands for the weight attached to research
e¤ort and  is the level of persistence the current years level of technology has on reducing
the price of capital accumulation in the future. The term Gt
Yt 1
represents public capitals
inuence in a¤ecting investment specic technological change in time period t + 1. For a
given ; increases in Gt relative to Yt 1 leads to increases in the future level of Z:We further
assume that aggregate investment activity, as captured by the aggregate capital-output ratio,
Kt
Yt 1
, a¤ects investment specic technological change. In particular, a higher aggregate stock
of capital in t; Kt; relative to Yt 1; raises Zt+1: At this stage, we make the following remarks
to compare our setup with that in Hu¤man (2008).
Remark 1 Assuming  = 1; m ! 0 and 3 = 0; in equation (7) yields Equation 2.9 in
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Hu¤man (2008) describing investment specic technological change.
Remark 2 We require  2 (0; 1) for the equilibrium growth rate to adjust to the steady state
balanced growth path.12
2.2 The Planners Problem
We rst solve the planners problem. The resource constraint the economy faces in each time
period t is given by
Ct + It  Yt(1  ) = AK1t n21t (mn2t)3(1  ) (8)
where agents consume Ct at time period t and invest It at time period t. Aggregate con-
sumption and investment add up to after-tax levels of output, Yt(1 ), in every time period.
The planner maximizes life-time utility of a representative agent given by (1) subject
to the economy wide resource constraint given by (8), the law of motion of private capital
in equation (4), the law of motion of public capital in equation, (5), the equation describing
investment specic technological change (7), the identity for total supply of labor given by
(3) and nally, the government budget constraint given by (6).13
2.2.1 First Order Conditions
The Lagrangian for the planners problem is given by,
L =
1P
t=0
t[logCt + log(1  n1t   n2t) + tfAK1t n21t (mn2t)3(1  )  Ct   Itg]: (9)
For simplicity, we assume that  = 1. The following rst order conditions obtain with respect
to Ct, Kt+1, n1t, and n2t; respectively14:
1
Ct
= t (10)
1
CtZt
= 1Yt+1(1 )
Ct+1Kt+1
+ 
2It+2(1 )(1 )
Ct+2Kt+1
+ 
3(1 )((1 ) 1)
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+3
Ct+j+3
(11)
12This contrasts with Hu¤man (2008) where  = 1 is required for growth rates of Z and output to be along
the balanced growth path. In Hu¤man (2004),  < 1 implies that the e¤ect of research spending diminishes
over time. This generates technical innovation having immediate productive e¤ects that can be maintained
only with more spending in the future. Therefore  = 1 is not needed for balanced growth.
13Clearly, Ct + It + I
g
t = Yt:
14See Appendix A for details.
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1
1 nt +
22(1 )
n1t
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+2
Ct+j+2
= 2Yt(1 )
Ctn1t
(12)
and,
1
1 nt =
3Yt(1 )
Ctn2t
+ It+1
Ct+1n2t
+ 
2( 3(1 ))
n2t
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+2
Ct+j+2
. (13)
Equation (10) represents the standard rst order condition for consumption, equating the
marginal utility of consumption to the shadow price of wealth. Equation (11) is an aug-
mented form of the standard Euler equation governing the consumption-savings decision of
the household. The rst term on the RHS of equation (11), 1Yt+1(1 )
Ct+1Kt+1
; corresponds to the
after tax marginal productivity of capital in t + 1. The second term, 
2It+2(1 )(1 )
Ct+2Kt+1
> 0; is
the (further) increment to the marginal productivity of capital that agents get in period t+2
by postponing consumption today. This is increasing in the investment-consumption ratio,
but adjusted by the weight, 1   ; of the aggregate capital-output ratio, in the investment
specic technological change equation. The third term, 
3(1 )((1 ) 1)
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+3
Ct+j+3
; is the
discounted increase in marginal productivity of investing in capital from period t+3 onwards.
This expression is adjusted by the term ((1 ) 1), which can be either positive or neg-
ative depending on the relative importance of capital in equation (7) vis-a-vis its direct
contribution to increasing output, from (2). It is easy to see that when  = 1; the additional
terms in the Euler equation are equal to zero, yielding the standard Euler equation.
Equation (12) denotes the optimization condition with respect to labor supply (n1t): If
we reorganize (12), we get the following expression for the marginal utility of leisure;
1
1 nt =
2Yt(1 )
Ctn1t
  22(1 )
n1t
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+2
Ct+j+2
: (14)
Since 0 <  < 1; the second term in the RHS, 
22(1 )
n1t
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+2
Ct+j+2
; is positive, which
constitutes a reduction in the marginal utility of leisure. This reduces n1 relative to the
standard case in which there is no investment specic technological change.
Similarly, the terms of (13), are,
1
1 nt =
3Yt(1 )
Ctn2t
+ It+1
Ct+1n2t
+ 
2( 3(1 ))
n2t
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+2
Ct+j+2
: (15)
The second and third terms in the RHS are the t > 0 increment to marginal utility of
leisure that accrues in the future because of n2s role in assisting both research e¤ort and
increasing output. However, because n2 has a direct and indirect e¤ect (through production
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and investment specic technological change, respectively), the future discounted gains are
adjusted by the term,    3(1  ). Going forward we assume    3(1  ) > 0 which
implies that nal good production is not n2 intensive.
We now derive the closed form decision rules based on the above rst order conditions.
2.2.2 Decision Rules
Lemma 1 Ct, It; nt; n1t;n2t are given by (16), (17), (18), where 0 <  < 1 is given by (19),
and 0 < x < 1 given by (20) are constants. The supply of labor is constant over time and is
independent of the tax rate. Then,
Ct = Yt(1  ); It = (1  )Yt(1  ) (16)
nt = n =
2[(1  )  2(1  )(1  )]
(2 + x)(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
; (17)
n1t = n1 = xn; n2t = n2 = (1  x)n; (18)
where  is given by
 =
(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )  1]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]
(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]
, (19)
and x is given by
x =
2(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
[2 + 3 + (1  )](1  ) + 2(1  )[   3(1  )  2(1  )]
: (20)
Proof. These expressions follow from the rst order conditions as shown in (10), (11), (12)
and (13). See appendix B for details.
How does a change in  a¤ect consumption and investment? While the decision rules
for consumption and investment given by (16) suggest that the levels of consumption and
investment would fall if the tax rates increases (because of the 1   term), the actual share
of after tax income spent on consumption given by (19) rises when  rises, although for
investment it falls.15 Intuitively, the representative agent does not invest as much in private
capital because of an enhanced role of public capital in augmenting investment specic
technological change.
15See Appendix F.
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We will show later that when  6= ; the allocations from the planners problem are
sub-optimal, even though there is balanced growth. The labor supply is a¤ected by : This
can be shown by the following lemma
Lemma 2 Increases in  has an ambiguous e¤ect on n1 but has a strong negative e¤ect on
n2 which leads to an overall reduction in n:
Proof. Shown in Appendix F.
An increase in  increases the share of n devoted to n1, i.e., @x@ > 0: Since
@
@
> 0 from
before, this implies @n
@
< 0: To see this, we can decompose the total change in n because of
changes in  by
@n
@
=
@n1
@
+
@n2
@
:
Given @x
@
> 0 and @
@
> 0 (and hence, @(1 x)
@
< 0) @n2
@
< 0 will be true: Since the change in
n1 due to a change in  can be written as
@n1
@
= x
@n
@
<0|{z}
+n
@x
@
>0|{z}
;
@n1
@
may or may not be negative. Hence, while an increase in  has an ambiguous e¤ect on
n1; it reduces n2 and since the latter e¤ect dominates, n falls.
This implies that an increased weight of public capital induces agents to supply lesser
labor (n), particularly towards research e¤ort (n2).
2.3 Stability of the Balanced Growth Path
To obtain the balanced growth path (BGP), we substitute the above decision rules into the
law of motion for investment specic technological progress, (7), to characterize the balanced
growth path (BGP). Given the decision rules (16), (17), (18), (20) and (6), we can re-write
the above law of motion as
Zt+1 = cMZt Z(1 )t 1 f()(1  )1 g(1 ) (21)
where cM is a constant and is expressed as
cM = B((1  m)(1  x)n)(1  )(1 )(1 ).
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If we dene the absolute growth rate by Zt+1
Zt
= gzt+1, then we can re-write (21) as
gzt+1 = g
 1
zt
cMf()(1  )1 g(1 ). (22)
Using (22) and the parameter restrictions in Remark 1, we will get the same constant
growth rates along the balanced growth path (BGP) as in Hu¤man (2008). We re-write (22)
in the following way,
gzt+1 =


g
(1 )
zt
; (23)
where 
 is a constant and is expressed as

 = cMf()(1  )1 g(1 ).
Given the assumptions it is easy to show that we can obtain a constant growth rate for Z, K,
G and Y . This condition necessarily implies 0 <  < 1 and 0 < x < 1 (as shown in Appendix
B). We therefore have the following lemma. Figure [1] shows the dynamic adjustment to the
steady state balanced growth graphically.
Lemma 3 On the steady state balanced growth path, the gross growth rate of Z, K, G and
Y are given by (24), and (25)
bgz = 
 11+(1 ) = [cMf()(1  )1 g(1 )] 12  ; (24)
bgk = bgg = bgz 11 1 ; bgy = bgk1 = bgz 11 1 : (25)
Proof. While bgz can be computed directly from (23), the expressions for the remaining
variables are derived in Appendix C.
There are several aspects of the equilibrium growth rate worth mentioning. First, the
growth rate is independent of the technology parameter, A; as in Hu¤man (2008). Second,
the growth rate of output, bgy; is less than bgk along the balanced growth path because equation
(7) is homogenous of degree 1 + .
Finally, from expression (24), the tax rate exerts a positive e¤ect on growth as well as a
negative e¤ect. This is similar to the equation characterizing the growth maximizing tax rate
in models with public capital. The mechanism here is however di¤erent. For small values of
the tax rate, a rise in  leads to higher public capital relative to output, Yt 1: This raises the
future value of investment specic technological change, Z: An increase in Z reduces the real
price of capital, stimulating investment and long run growth. However, for higher tax rates,
further increases in the tax rate depresses after tax income, and investment. This reduces
12
Figure 1: The dynamic adjustment process to a steady state BGP
G relative to Y , lowering Z; and depressing investment and long run growth. Hence, there
is a unique growth maximizing tax rate.
Using the expression for bgz in (24) we can characterize the growth maximizing tax rate
as follows:
Proposition 1 In the steady state, there exists a unique growth maximizing tax rate, given
by b = .
Proof. See appendix D.
Proposition [1] sets a benchmark for the planner to set the optimal tax rate. If the
planner wants to maximize growth, he should set the tax rate to : The higher the weight
attached to Gt
Yt 1
in the investment specic technological change equation, the higher should
be the optimal tax rate set by the planner. This result is intuitive since it suggests that the
government would have to impose a higher tax rate on income if public capital were to play
a greater role in driving investment specic technological change.
13
1 0.35
2 0.4
3 0.25
 0.95
 0.67
 1
m 0.2
 0.5
 0.2

2 in the model with convex costs
0.1 in the model with concave costs
c
0.4 in the model with convex costs
0.01 in the model with concave costs
Table 1: Parameter Values
Figure [2] calibrates the impact of a change in  on the long run growth rate for two
arbitrary values of . Parameter values taken from Table 1.16 When  = 0:5; the growth
maximizing tax rate is given by t1 = 0:5: When  = 0:6; the growth maximizing tax rate
rises to t2 = 0:6. However, because  has increased, there is a level downward shift in the
growth tax curve associated with the higher value of  (the red line is lower than the blue
line). This is because of the reduction in growth due to a reduction n2: Due to this e¤ect; the
planner needs to raise taxes to maximize growth, given that now there is a higher weightage
on Gt
Yt 1
. In sum, a higher value of  tilts the growth-tax curve in a south-westerly direction,
leading to a higher growth maximizing tax rate. The net e¤ect on growth however depends
on which e¤ect (reduction in n2 versus more weightage on GtYt 1 ) dominates. This is sensitive
to the value of . In particular, the e¤ect of n2 on reducing growth is higher for higher values
of . Likewise, if there is a reduction in , n2 may increase su¢ ciently leading to higher
growth depending on the value of .
Finally, the growth rate is decreasing in m; the weight attached to n2 in production. In
other words, as m increases, more n2 (specialized R&D labor) is devoted to production of
the nal good, and less to investment specic technological change. This reduces the future
value of Z; and in the long run lowers optimal growth although there is no change in the
growth optimizing tax rate. This is because a higher m leads to a level downward shift in
the growth tax curve, for all tax rates. To illustrate the quantitative impact of higher m on
16Without loss of generality we assume A = 1 and B = 1. The parameters which have a () against their
values means that they have been borrowed from Hu¤man (2008). The rest of the parameters have been
assigned in order to ensure feasibility.
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Figure 2: Comparing optimal taxes for di¤erent weights on the public input
growth, we rst increase m arbitrarily from 0.2 to 0.3. We nd that growth falls from 0.491
to 0.4622 (the di¤erence being 0.0288). For higher values of m that is, increasing m from
0.5 to 0.6, we nd that the fall in growth is 0.3968 to 0.3587 (the di¤erence is 0.0381). This
shows that the fall in the growth rate is higher for higher values of m. Therefore, a greater
reduction in the share of n2 available for future Z has a more detrimental, and non-linear
e¤ect on growth.
2.4 The Decentralized Equilibrium
Consider an economy that is populated by a set of homogenous and innitely lived agents.
There is no population growth and the representative rms are completely owned by agents,
who supply labor for nal goods production, n1; and R&D, n2. Agents derive utility from
consumption of the nal good and leisure given in (1). Agents fund consumption and invest-
ment decisions from their after tax wages w1 and w2; which they receive for supplying labor
n1 and n2, prots t earned from the nal goods production, which they take as given, and
the returns to capital lent out for production at each time period t .
The representative rm produces the nal good based on (2) where the law of motion of
private capital is given by (4). The government now funds public investment, Igt ; at each time
period t using a distortionary tax imposed on labor, n 2 ( 1; 1); and capital,  k 2 ( 1; 1)
respectively. Like Hu¤man (2008), it is assumed that prots are taxed according to the same
rate as capital income.
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2.4.1 The Firms Problem
Firms solve a dynamic optimization problem which, at time t; has capital stock, Kt; and
Zt: Let v(Kt; Zt) denote the value function of the rm at time t. Like Hu¤man (2008), the
rms optimization problem, assuming full depreciation, is given by,
v(Kt; Zt) = max
Kt+1;n1t;n2t

(Yt   w1tn1t   w2tn2t) (1   k)  Kt+1
Zt
+ v(Kt+1; Zt+1)

, (26)
which it maximizes subject to (5) and (7). We assume that rms dont borrow or lend in
the credit market and hence they assume that future payo¤s are discounted at the rate :17
From the rms maximization exercise, we get the following rst order conditions,
fKt+1g : 1Zt = 
 
1Yt+1(1 k)
Kt+1
+ (1 )(1 )Kt+3
Kt+1Zt+2
+ 
2(1 )((1 ) 1)
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jj
Kt+j+4
Zt+j+3
!
fn1tg : w1t(1   k) = 2Yt(1 k)n1t| {z }
MPn1(1 k)
  22(1 )
n1t
1P
j=0
jjKt+j+3
Zt+j+2| {z }
D
fn2tg : w2t(1   k) = 3Yt(1 k)n2t| {z }
MPn2(1 k)
+ Kt+2
Zt+1n2t
+ 
2( 3(1 ))
n2t
1P
j=0
jjKt+j+3
Zt+j+2| {z }
E
.
Because of investment specic technological change, factor prices are no longer equal
to the standard marginal products. In particular, the wage paid to n1 is reduced by the
term D
(1 k) ; while the wage paid to n2 is increased by the term
E
(1 k) : In particular, w1 =
MPn1   D(1 k) and w2 = MPn2 + E(1 k) :The general point to note is that, w1 = w2 does
not imply that MPn1 = MPn2 unless the restriction, D + E = 0:18 Figure [3] shows how
investment specic technological change acts like a tax on n1 and a subsidy to n2: This e¤ect
is magnied by the changes in  k:
17In Section (3); we allow rms to borrow and lend in the credit market, which implies that rms discount
future payo¤s by 11+r :
18Intuitively, because investment specic technological change has a dynamic e¤ect on the marginal pro-
ductivity of factor inputs, we cannot restrict ourselves to the static marginal productivities to calculate factor
prices.
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Figure 3: The e¤ect of investment specic technological change on n1 and n2
2.4.2 The Agents Problem
A representative agent maximizes (1) subject to the following consumer budget constraint
(CBC),
Ct +
Kt+1
Zt
= [w1tn1t + w2tn2t](1  n) + [Yt   (w1tn1t + w2tn2t)](1   k); (27)
the laws of motion given by (4), (5) and (7), total labor supply given by (3), and takes factor
prices and prots as given. The rst term on the right hand side denotes after tax wage
income. The second term is the rms capital income plus prots, which is taxed at the rate,
 k: The following restriction required for decentralizing the planners allocations.
Remark 3 Suppose that    3(1   ) > 0; which ensures that w1t = w2t > 0: Then,
Dn1 = En2 is necessary and su¢ cient to decentralize the planners allocation at every time
period, t.
The condition that, Dn1 = En2; means a reduction in the total wage bill paid to n1 due
to investment specic technological change gets o¤set by an equivalent increase in the wage
bill paid to n2. This ensures that the total wage bill paid by the rm to n does not depart
17
from the marginal productivities paid to each type under investment specic technological
change for any combination of factor income taxes.
Under Remark (3), the CBC from equation (27) can be written as
Ct +
Kt+1
Zt
= Yt
where  = (1  1)(1  n) + (1)(1   k). This implies the government budget constraint
(GBC) is given by
Igt = (1 )Yt: (28)
In general, any factor income tax combination decentralizes the planners allocations as
long as Remark (3) is imposed, because of the o¤setting e¤ects on the total wage bill of the
rm.
2.4.3 The Agents First Order Conditions
The Lagrangian given below for the agents problem is given by
L =
1P
t=0
t[logCt + log(1  n1t   n2t) + tfYt   Ct   Itg]. (29)
The optimization conditions with respect to Ct, Kt+1, n1t, and n2t; are given by equations
(30), (31), (32) and (33) respectively:
1
Ct
= t (30)
1
CtZt
= 1Yt+1
Ct+1Kt+1
+ 
2(1 )(1 )It+2
Ct+2Kt+1
+ 
3(1 )((1 ) 1)
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+3
Ct+j+3
(31)
1
1 nt +
22(1 )
n1t
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+2
Ct+j+2
= 2Yt
Ctn1t
(32)
1
1 nt =
3Yt
Ctn2t
+ It+1
Ct+1n2t
+ 
2( 3(1 ))
n2t
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+2
Ct+j+2
. (33)
The above rst order conditions can be derived in the same way as the planners version
as shown in Appendix A. Their interpretation is also the same as before, except that 1  
is replaced by . The allocations that result from Remark (3) are also constrained Pareto
Optimal. The closed form decision rules are characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 4 In the decentralized equilibrium, the expressions for Ct, It; nt; n1t;n2t are given
by the same decision rules derived in (34), and (17), (18) respectively, where 0 <  < 1 is
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given by (19) and 0 < x < 1 is given by (20), with
Ct = Yt and It = (1  )Yt. (34)
Proof. The above expressions can be constructed from the rst order conditions given by
equations (30), (31), (32) and (33), as explained in Appendix B for the planners version.
The rst order conditions governing the planners allocations can be easily be seen to
be replicated by the decentralized equilibrium, once we assume  k = n =  . In this case,
 = 1    ; and the rst order conditions characterizing the planners allocations obtain.
Hence, the comparative statics of consumption, investment, and labor input vis-a-vis changes
in  remain unchanged. The gross growth rate of Z, K, G and Y at the steady state can
also be derived in a similar fashion. As in the planners version, the condition for dynamic
stability is the same, i.e., 0 <  < 1. We therefore have the following lemma
Lemma 5 In the steady state of the decentralized economy, the gross growth rate of Z, is
given by (35) while the gross growth rates for K, G and Y are given by (36)
bgz = 
 12  , where 
 = cMf(1 )()1 g(1 ), cM = B((1  m)(1  bx)bn)(1  b)(1 )(1 )
(35)bgk = bgg = bgz 11 1 ; bgy = bgk1 = bgz 11 1 : (36)
Proof. These are derived in the same way as in the planners version.
Note that the expressions for the equilibrium long run growth rate are identical to those
in the planned economy, except that the growth rates di¤er because  need not equal 1   :
We want to check under what conditions the growth maximizing allocations from the
planners problem can be replicated by the decentralized economy. From the steady state
growth rate given by (35), this leads to a second proposition.
Proposition 2 If factor income taxes are chosen such that a linear combination of factor
income taxes is equal to ;i.e.,
(1  1)(cn) + 1( b k) =  = b . (37)
then the decentralized allocations can replicate the growth maximizing allocations from the
planners problem.
Proof. Shown in Appendix E.
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The proposition above suggests that there is no unique combination of labor and capital
income taxes which maximizes growth. In particular, pick a value of  and one of the two
tax rates. Lemma (5) yields a La¤er curve for the other factor income tax in terms of  and
the given tax. Changes in the value of the given tax rate causes a horizontal shift in the
La¤er curve. With the new La¤er curve, optimality is restored when  = : Further, if the
condition specied in the proposition holds, the planners allocations can be achieved from
the solutions of the agents version. Since there does not exist any unique growth optimizing
tax rate combination for cn and b k the planner could choose multiple tax/subsidy schemes
(subject to the restriction placed inRemark (3) such that the convex combination will always
equal the planners growth optimizing tax rate of . Under this condition, the solution to the
agents version replicates the planners optimization solution. We therefore have the following
proposition
Proposition 3 cn R b = )cn R b =  R b k:
Proof. This is obtained from equation (37).
From equation (37), it follows that if one of the factors receives a subsidy, the other factor
must be su¢ ciently taxed such that the optimality rule given by (37) is satised.19
2.5 Welfare
We are interested in evaluating whether the optimality results for taxes vary when the rule
is to maximize welfare and not growth for the model in Section (2:2) and (2:4:1). Since
consumption is a xed fraction of after tax income, it grows at the same gross growth rate
of output at the steady state as shown in Lemma 1 and Lemma 3. The total labor supplied
is also constant at each time period t. Using this information, we can re-write the life-time
utility given in (1) in the planners version as
 =   +  log(1  ) + 	 log[()(1  )1 ] (38)
where  ; and 	 denote all other terms independent of the at tax rate  . We show this
in Appendix G. It is clear from the above expression for welfare that the maximizing tax
rate for the planners model is less than the tax rate which maximizes growth. This happens
because consumption is scaled down by (1 ) at every time period even though the balanced
growth rate is a¤ected by  from the last term in (38). This gives us the following result.
19We have shown in Lemma 1 and in Lemma 4 that 0 <  < 1 given by (19), 0 < x < 1 given by (20) and
the supply of labor given by (17) are constants.
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Proposition 4 The welfare maximizing tax rate, w; is less than the growth maximizing tax
rate and is given by,
w =

21(1  )
21(1  ) + (1  1)(2  )

 = ' <  = b ;
where ' =
h
21(1 )
21(1 )+(1 1)(2 )
i
< 1:
Proof. This can be obtained by di¤erentiating (38) with respect to  .
In the agents version, the life-time welfare function can be expressed as
 = ++ log() + 	 log[(1 )()1 ] (39)
where ; and 	 denote all other terms independent of the tax rates n and  k. We get the
same result as in the case of the planners version, as shown in the following proposition
Proposition 5 There exists a convex combination of factor income taxes, given by
(1  1)(wn ) + 1(wk ) = ' <  = (1  1)(cn) + 1( b k);
where this combination maximizes agents welfare and also yields the planners welfare asso-
ciated with w in Proposition (4).
Proof. We get the above equation from the welfare optimization conditions with respect to
n and  k.
In sum, we have characterized both the planners and agents problem. We have shown
that there exists a unique growth maximizing tax rate, which is greater than the tax rate
that maximizes long run welfare. This inequality ranking also strictly holds true when agents
maximize welfare.
3 Robustness
In order to establish the robustness of our results we rst show that if agents are allowed to
borrow and lend by participating in the credit market as in Hu¤man (2008), the planners
allocations can still be decentralized using multiple factor income tax combinations. We then
show that the results obtained in Section (2); generalizes to a model where only n1 enters into
the production function of the nal good, and n2 a¤ects investment specic technological
change.
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3.1 Decentralizing the model under a borrowing-lending setup
As shown in Appendix J, if agents are allowed to borrow and lend in the credit market, the
planners allocations can still be decentralized using multiple factor income tax combinations
as above.20 The crucial di¤erence is that ; n and x depend on n and  k21. If we restrict
factor income taxes to be positive, then we can numerically show that the factor income tax
mix that decentralizes the planners allocations are inversely related to each other similar to
equation (37). However the relationship is non-linear. If we allow for both n and  k to be
either a tax or a subsidy, then we can numerically show that such a mix still decentralizes
the planners allocations, although the particular combination of n ? 0 and  k ? 0 depends
on the parameter values of  and . For the case of positive factor income taxes, Figure (4)
plots the set of taxes that decentralizes the planners growth maximizing allocations.
Figure 4: Decentralizing the planners growth rate - under borrowing and lending
20As in Hu¤man (2008, p. 3456) the agents budget constraint is given by
at+1 = (1 + r)at + wt(n1t + n2t)(1  n)  ct:
In equilibrium,
at = Kt:
21This is shown in Appendix J
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3.2 Decentralizing using only n1 in production
As shown in Appendix K, the results obtained in Section (2); generalizes to a model where
only n1 enters into the production of the nal good, and n2 a¤ects investment specic
technological change, as in Hu¤man (2008). Our main result - which we show numerically -
is:
Proposition 6 For any given value of  and one of the factor income taxes, there is at least
one feasible value for the other factor income tax that decentralizes the planners allocations.
Proof. See Appendix K.
In sum, the robustness exercises in Sections (3:1) and (3:2) suggest that decentralizing
the planners allocations leads to indeterminate, or multiple, factor income tax rates.22 The
following Figure [5] illustrates the case with only n1 in production.
Figure 5: Decentralizing the planners growth rate without n1 in production
The above exercises suggest that the optimal factor income tax mix is indeterminate in
two natural variants of the model. This indeterminacy result therefore gives the planner the
exibility to choose policy rules from an innitely large set. As we show in the following
22It can be shown that welfare results do not coincide with growth. The results are available from the
authors on request.
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section, accounting for administrative costs, however, restricts this set of optimal feasible
tax mix for the planner and eventually a unique factor income tax mix emerges as the only
feasible solution.
4 The Model with Administrative Costs
The presence of administrative costs during tax collection is one of the major reasons (the
other being the dead-weight loss of imposing the tax), for the governments inability to
change (particularly increase) tax rates with ease for the purpose of raising revenue (see
Bovenberg and Goulder (1986), Yitzhaki (1979), Yang (1989)). We provide specic condi-
tions under which the tax rate di¤ers at the optimum compared to the benchmark model
when administrative costs for implementing public investment occur. In particular, as
long as administrative costs are not linear, we show that there will always exists a unique
combination of distortionary tax rates on labor income and capital income.
4.1 The Planners Model
As before, the government collects taxes by imposing a proportional tax rate on income to
fund G to contribute to investment specic technological change. It however incurs admin-
istrative costs with respect to tax collection. The government budget constraint takes the
following form
Igt = (   !())Yt
where !() represents continuously varying administrative costs with respect to the tax rate
 : Here, !0() > 0, which implies that the administrative cost is assumed to be increasing
in the tax rate. In what follows, we will assume that these costs could be linear, convex,
or concave with respect to the tax rate, and show that these assumptions have di¤erent
implications for the steady state balanced growth path.
4.1.1 Convex Administrative Costs
Suppose that administrative costs are strictly convex with respect to the tax rate (e.g.,
Perotti (1993), Buiter and Sibert (2011)), i.e., !00() > 0. By strict convexity we mean
that a proportional increase in the tax rate causes a more than proportional increase in the
collection costs and that governments experience greater di¢ culty in imposing a higher tax
rate on income as compared to a lower tax rate. In such a scenario, if achievable growth rates
are much lower than as compared to the case where such costs are absent, the government,
at an optimum, would consider imposing a lower tax rate on income.
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We parametrize the function, !() = c; where 0 < c  1 is like a "xed level cost"
parameter and  > 1 is the degree of convexity. The government budget constraint takes
the form
Igt = (   c)Yt: (40)
We assume that agents who are subject to these tax rates are una¤ected by the administrative
costs the government incurs for imposing taxes. It is like as if the government incurs an
additional expenditure towards enhancing investment specic technological change. For this
reason the rst order conditions are the same as in the baseline model and are therefore
given by (10), (11), (12) and (13). The decision rules are also the same and are given by
(16), (17), (18), (19) and (20) as shown in Lemma 1.
Given the government budget constraint in (40), the law of motion for investment specic
technological change according to (7) and the decision rules for consumption, investment and
the labor supplies as (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), we can rewrite (7) in terms of the steady
state growth rate,
bgz = [B((1  m)(1  x)n)(1  )(1 )(1 )f(   c)(1  )1 g(1 )] 12  : (41)
As before, the growth rate, with administrative costs, is increasing in B; decreasing in m;
and increasing in n2: Further, an increase in c reduces the growth rate. We now get the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 The growth maximizing tax rate, AC (tax with administrative costs) in a
model with convex administrative costs is always less than the growth maximizing tax without
such costs, that is, b = . The optimal tax is obtained from the following expression
(1  AC)[1  c(AC) 1] = (1  )(AC   c(AC)); (42)
where,
AC = b =  when c = 0 or when  = 1: (43)
Proof. Shown in Appendix H
Given that administrative costs with respect to the tax rates are convex, the steady state
optimal growth rate given by (41) will be lower than the steady state optimal growth rate in
the baseline model. This is shown in Figure [6] where t is the optimal tax rate as derived in
the baseline model. The tax rate t1 is the growth optimizing tax rate when the government
faces convex administrative costs.
For instance, Perotti (1993) and Buiter and Sibert (2011) assume that convex adminis-
trative costs are quadratic in nature ( = 2). Assuming c = 1; the optimal tax is now given
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Figure 6: Optimal tax rates across di¤erent models - with and without administrative costs
by the following equation
(1  AC)(1  2AC) = (1  )(AC   (AC)2) (44)
which gives us
AC =

1 + 
< b = : (45)
Therefore the general result in a model with convex administrative costs is that the planner
will choose to charge a lower tax rate compared to the case when there are no administrative
costs. These costs hamper the availability of resources for funding public expenditure thereby
leading to lower growth rates. But the planner would choose to charge a lower tax rate at
the optimum since the costs of imposing higher tax rates are increasing in the tax rate.
4.1.2 Other Cases: Concave or Linear Administrative Costs
The government budget constraint for the planners version is again given by equation (40)
but now instead of having strict convexity in administrative costs with respect to the tax rate,
we assume strict concavity (!00() < 0) in administrative costs, i.e.,  < 1. Anecdotally, strict
concavity of administrative costs is suggestive of a more e¢ cient administrative machinery
compared to the previous case with convex costs.23 Such administrative costs increase with
23This may be due to employing better technology that may assist in revenue collection. See Slemrod
(1990).
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a higher tax rate but at a decreasing rate. Therefore at the optimum, the government has
an incentive to impose a higher tax on income as compared to the case of the baseline model
even though the steady state growth rates is lower because of the loss due to administrative
costs. This again is shown in Figure [6] where now t2 is the growth optimizing tax rate when
the government faces concave administrative costs.
Linear administrative costs simply cause a level downward shift in the optimal growth
rate. The optimal tax however remains the same. This is shown in Figure [7].
Figure 7: The model with and without linear costs
4.2 The Decentralized Equilibrium
There are two separate factor income taxes imposed on labor and capital income, i.e., n and
capital  k respectively. The administrative costs incurred by the government for imposing
tax rate on labor and capital are assumed to be di¤erent, in terms of the xed level costs
although not in terms of the degree of convexity or concavity. Hence the cost of imposing
 k is c1

k while that for n is c2

n. The following is the government budget constraint
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Igt = [1 k + (1  1) k   c1k   c2n]Yt. (46)
The rest of the specication remains the same, just as in the baseline agents model. The
rst order conditions are given by equations (30), (31), (32) and (33) and the decision rules
24This equation is derived in the same way as in the baseline model, where the rms prot maximization
solutions are substituted into wages and rate of return on capital. In addition, there are also administrative
costs of imposing each tax rate.
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by (16), (17), (18), (19) and (20) as shown in Lemma 3. We now substitute the decision
rules given by equations (17), (18), (19) and (20) as in Lemma 3 and the government budget
constraint given by equation (46) into the investment specic technological change equation
given by (7) to obtain the following steady state growth rate for Z
bgz = [B((1  m)(1  x)n)(1  )(1 )(1 )f(1   c1k   c2n)()1 g(1 )] 12  , (47)
where,  = 1   1 k   (1   1)n. Unlike in the baseline framework where administrative
costs were absent, we show that there exists a unique combination of the tax on labor income
and on capital income given by the following proposition.
Proposition 8 There exists a unique combination of positive tax rates n and  k which
maximizes the steady state growth rate given by
 n
 k
 1
=

1  1
1

c1
c2

: (48)
When c1 = c2;
 ? 1)  n =
(
1  1
1
 1
 1
)
 k ?  k:
Proof. Shown in Appendix I
This inequality result holds for 0 < 1 < 0:5. The proposition suggests that if the scale
constant, c; and variable costs are identical, the government could maximize e¢ ciency by
charging a higher tax on labor income. The tax on capital income could therefore exceed the
tax on labor income only under the special case when the xed level costs of imposing  n
relative to  k su¢ ciently exceeds the relative share of total labor to capital in production.
In other words, capital income could be subject to a higher tax rate rate compared to that
on labor provided it is less costly to impose a higher tax on capital.
This specication gives us uniqueness, which was absent in the baseline model. This
happens because  a¤ects the rst order conditions relating the growth rate to the optimal
factor income tax rates symmetrically (see Appendix I). The ratio of factor income taxes,
as seen in equation (48), is therefore independent of : However, individual factor income
taxes still depend on  .
4.3 Decentralizing the planners allocation
While the above results suggest that there can exist a unique combination of factor income
taxes that maximizes growth in the agents problem, it does not guarantee whether such a
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unique combination also decentralizes the planners growth maximizing tax rule. While we
cant show this analytically, we can show numerically that for feasible yet small values of
c and increasing  > 1 reduces the set of feasible factor income tax mix the planner could
choose from. In fact the size of this set shrinks as the convexity of the administrative costs
increases, and eventually a unique factor income tax mix is the only feasible solution. Figure
[8] illustrates this uniqueness result.
Figure 8: Decentralizing the planners growth rate in the presence of convex administrative
costs
5 A Numerical Example
In this section, we use the baseline model in Section (2:2) and (2:4) to quantify the growth
e¤ects of factor income tax changes.25 Our focus is to assess the growth e¤ects of changing
factor income taxes. We use parameter values for the US from Hu¤man (2008), and other
parameters from the literature. We use arbitrary values of , , and m because of the lack of
clear empirical estimates for these parameters. Table [1] contains the parameter values used
in the numerical exercise. We are interested in two di¤erent policy experiments: the e¤ects
of 1) equi-proportionate changes in fact or income taxes and 2) revenue neutral changes on
growth and welfare. We then augment these estimates assuming di¤erent cost technologies.
25These exercises were done in Matlab. The codes are available from the authors on request.
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We rst analyze the impact of changing the tax on capital on the growth rate for a given
value of the labor income tax in the decentralized model using the optimality condition (37),
(1  1)(cn) + 1( b k) =  = b :
We earlier quantied the e¤ect of an increase in , in the investment specic technological
change equation on the equilibrium growth rate. We showed that a higher , leads to
a higher growth maximizing tax rate. This e¤ect on growth can be decomposed into two
e¤ects: the e¤ect of a higher higher  on labor e¤ort devoted to research, and the direct
e¤ect of a higher weightage on public capital relative to output on increasing the level of in-
vestment specic technological change. The quantitative results show that an increase in the
government spending share reduces the labor input devoted to research e¤ort which reduces
growth, but increases the level of technological change which increases growth. Hence, the
net change in growth depends on the magnitude of these two e¤ects and on the parameter
.
The above dynamics are replicated when there are tax changes in the decentralized equi-
librium, except that at the optimum, there does not exist any unique combination of tax
rates on capital and labor income which maximizes growth. For illustrative purposes, we
arbitrarily pin down a particular value for the tax on labor, cn = 0:4. According to (37) 
where  = 0:5 and 1 = 0:35 which yields b k  0:6857.26 This can also be replicated if we
plot the growth schedule of gz xing cn at 0:4  and varying b k.
This is shown in Figure [9] where the optimum combination of cn and b k is given by
(0:4; 0:6857); corresponding to t1. Suppose we decrease the tax rate on labor income and
increase the tax rate on capital by 0:1 in comparison to this combination at the optimum;
that is, n and  k are now given by (0:3; 0:7857):27 These tax rates no longer satisfy (37).
Growth is no longer at its highest value, although in comparison to the growth maximizing
factor income tax mix, (0:3; 0:87143) given by t3which satises (37); the gross growth
rate is marginally (though not signicantly) less: by a magnitude of  3:303 10 4. Hence,
deviating from the optimal rule by changing factor income taxes in equal proportions has a
negligible e¤ect on long run growth and welfare. The reason why this happens is because of
the assumed share of output accruing to capital in the nal goods production, 1 where we
assume that 0 < 1 < 0:5: Under this restriction, the absolute rate of change in growth rate
due to a change in the tax rate on capital income will strictly be less than the absolute rate
26The revenue neutral rule for changes in factor income taxes is given by, ckcn =   (1 1)1 :
27The value of k = 0:7857 is given by the point t2.
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Figure 9: Impact of a change in the tax on labor income on the capital tax La¤er curve
of change in the growth rate due to a change in the tax on labor. That is@gz@ k
 <  @gz@n
 :
This means, deviating away from the tax rate on capital according to an optimal tax rule
will only have a moderate e¤ect on the growth rates. This result is consistent with the
results of the policy experiments in Hu¤man (2008) relating the e¤ect of capital income tax
changes on growth. He nds that changes in factor income taxes have a minimal e¤ect on
the growth rate. However, as evident from Figure [9], depending upon whether changes to
the capital income tax rate are equi-proportionate or revenue neutral, the e¤ect on growth
rate would be negative (but marginal), or zero, respectively. This contrasts with Hu¤man
(2008) where a change in the tax on labor income has a negative e¤ect on the growth rate.28
If now we reverse the exercise by rst xing  k at the arbitrary value of 0:6 and then lower
it to 0:3; and then calibrate the equi-proportionate increase and revenue neutral increase
in n, we nd that changes in growth are of the same order when we compare an equi-
proportionate change to a revenue neutral change when we xed tax n and varied  k.
However, there is an important di¤erence. An equi-proportionate change in n means that
28For a large arbitrary change in taxes, our calibrated results show that the "growth-gap" between equi-
proportionate and revenue neutral changes is still not large, but larger than the case for small changes in
taxes. For instance, a reduction in n from 0:6 to 0:3 implies that k rises from 0:315 to 0:87143. In contrast,
an equiproportionate change in k is 0:61. The growth di¤erence is still roughly 3:303 10 4:
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now we increase the tax on labor from 0:44615 (when  k is 0:6) to 0:74615 (when  k is
0:3) which is signicantly higher than the revenue neutral value (at 0:607). Since the equi-
proportionate change in n exceeds the revenue neutral value of n; reducing n would
increase growth.
We now conduct a similar policy experiment with administrative costs as in Section (5).
For simplicity we have assumed that the xed level cost parameter c and the variable cost
parameter  are the same for both tax rates on labor income and on capital income. We rst
consider the case with convex administrative costs, and assume (arbitrarily) that c = 0:4
and  = 2. Plugging the value of c and  into equation (48), and then substituting out the
resulting value of n in terms of  k into the rst order condition derived in Appendix I, the
optimal tax rate on capital income  k is found to be approximately 0:23. Using this value
for  k, and using the equation (48) we get 

n = 0:42. We now get Figure [10].
Figure 10: Policy analysis in the model with convex costs
Here t1 represents the point ( n; 

k) = (0:42; 0:24).
29 This gives us the growth maximizing
tax mix with convex administrative costs. Therefore, any change in the tax on labor such
that n 6=  n; such as at point t3; where we arbitrarily reduce n by 0:1 to 0:32; and also
re-calibrate  k according to (48) reduces growth to a sub-optimal value. This is because the
new tax mix at t3 does not satisfy optimality.30 However, if the choice of  k corresponding
29Note that there are two solutions but the second solution k = 0:69 and 

n = 1:28 is not feasible.
30Here, @gz@k > 0:
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to n = 0:32 were to satisfy optimality (hence  k satises
@gz
@k
jn=:32 = 0); then the optimal
tax on capital would have to be signicantly higher than  k:This is denoted by point t2;
where growth has marginally fallen (by roughly 3:6  10 3), but by an amount greater
than the growth fall in the model without administrative costs. In sum, because of convex
administrative costs, deviating from the tax rule, (48), will lead to a greater fall in long run
growth and welfare.31
We now look at the case with concave administrative costs. With c = 0:01 and  = 0:1
we can show that the optimal tax rate on capital income  k  0:73.32 Using this value for
 k and using the equation (48) we can show that 

n  0:4013. This is shown in Figure [11].
Figure 11: Policy analysis in the model with concave costs
Here t1 is given by ( n; 

k) = (0:4013; 0:714).
33 We conduct a similar exercise of lowering
the tax on labor income by 0:1 and back out the value for the corresponding tax (shown
as t2) on capital income from the equation (48). This will give us a tax rate on capital
income equal to 0:594 which does not give us the optimal growth rate. However a tax rate
on capital income, much higher than t1, and given by t3 in Figure [11] will ensure optimal
31If we allow n to fall by 0:2 to 0:22 - a large arbitary amount, we nd that a decrease in k from (48)
is 0:1209. For n = 0:22; k = 0:345. There is larger reduction in the growth rate.
32This choice of c and  ensures feasibility.
33The second solutions to k and 

n are approximately close to 0 which means that the funding available
for the public input will be close to zero. We therefore ignore this solution.
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growth rates. The di¤erence in the growth rates by moving from a tax on capital income of
0:594 as in t3 to 0:908 (moving to t2) is roughly around 3:4  10 3 which is also not large.
Hence, having concave administrative costs suggests that there is negligible change in the
optimal growth rate when the tax on capital income is increased.34 Given concave costs, on
normative grounds, a planner could charge a higher tax rate on capital without changing
the optimal growth rate when there is a fall in the tax on labor income compared to  n.
6 Conclusion
This paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium endogenous growth model in which pub-
lic capital inuences investment specic technological change. We characterize the growth
and welfare maximizing tax rates in the planners problem and the decentralized equilibrium.
Unlike the existing literature where public input a¤ects current output directly, in our model
it a¤ects future output through its e¤ect on investment specic technological change. Our
main result is that there exist innitely many capital and labor tax-subsidy combinations
that decentralize the planners growth rate. Hence the optimal factor income tax mix is
indeterminate which gives the planner the exibility to choose policy rules from an innitely
large set. The indeterminacy in the factor income tax mix, and its robustness, is the main
result of our paper.
Accounting for administrative costs, however, reduces the set of optimal feasible tax mix
of the planner. In fact the size of this set shrinks as the convexity of the administrative
costs increases, and eventually a unique factor income tax mix emerges as the only feasible
solution. From a growth-tax policy standpoint, our numerical results are consistent with
some other papers in this literature which shows that capital income taxation may increase
growth.
While we do not directly solve for the Ramsey optimal scal policy allocations, our results
are related to a celebrated literature started by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), who nd
that capital taxation decreases welfare and a zero capital tax is thus e¢ cient in the long-
run steady state. From a growth standpoint, models analyzing the equilibrium relationship
between capital income taxes and growth also typically nd that an increase of the capital
income tax reduces the return to private investment, which in turn implies a decrease of
capital accumulation and thus growth (see Lucas (1990) and Rebelo (1991)). In contrast,
our results are consistent with some other papers in this literature which show that the
34This result is broadly consistent with the results in Hu¤man (2008) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995)
who show that growth rates are una¤ected by a deviation of tax rates on capital income away from their
equilibrium values.
34
optimal capital income tax is positive, i.e., taxation may increase growth (see Uhlig and
Yanagawa (1996) and Rivas (2003)). On normative grounds, our results suggests that policy
makers may want to measure precisely the relative cost associated with factor income tax
collection before setting factor income taxes.
In terms of future work, one could formalize the optimal capital income taxation under
the Ramsey policy within our environment.
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Technical Appendix
The appendix contains all the calculations and proofs of propositions present in the paper.
Appendix A: The planners FOCs for the baseline model
The following is the FOC with respect to Ct
t
1
Ct
  tt = 0:
Hence, we get
fCtg : 1
Ct
= t.
This gives us equation (10). The FOC with respect to Kt+1 is as follows:
fKt+1g :  t
Zt
+ t+1
1Yt+1(1  )
Kt+1
  t+1 @
@Kt+1
(
Kt+2
Zt+1
)  2t+2 @
@Kt+1
(
Kt+3
Zt+2
)  ::: = 0:
Note that
@Zt
@Kt+1
=
@Zt+1
@Kt+1
= 0,
@Zt+2
@Kt+1
= (1 )(1 )Zt+2
Kt+1
,
@Zt+3
@Kt+1
=
Zt+3
Zt+2
@Zt+2
@Kt+1
 1(1 )Zt+3
Kt+1
:
We therefore have
@Zt+3
@Kt+1
= (1  )Zt+3
Kt+1
((1  )  1):
And hence for any other future time period
@Zt+3+j
@Kt+1
= j(1  )Zt+3+j
Kt+1
[(1  )  1]; forj = 0:
Therefore, substituting the above values in {Kt+1}, considering 1Ct+j = t+j and It+j =
Kt+1+j
Zt+j
; j = 0 and assuming full depreciation (that is  = 1), we obtain the following FOC
for {Kt+1} which is shown in equation (11)
fKt+1g : 1CtZt =
1Yt+1(1 )
Ct+1Kt+1
+ 
2It+2(1 )(1 )
Ct+2Kt+1
+ 
3(1 )((1 ) 1)
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jjIt+j+3
Ct+j+3
.
Next, the FOC with respect to n1t is given by
 1
1 nt +
t2Yt(1 )
n1t
 t @@n1t (
Kt+1
Zt
) t+1 @@n1t (
Kt+2
Zt+1
) 2t+2 @@n1t (
Kt+3
Zt+2
)  ::: = 0: Given that
Zt+1 =
B(1  m)n2tZt (Gt )(1 )(K1 t )(1 )(K 1t 1 )(1 )(n 21t 1)(1 )( 3m n 32t 1)(1 )
A(1 )
;
1
this implies
@
@n1t
(
Kt+1
Zt
) =
@
@n1t
(
Kt+2
Zt+1
) = 0:
We further have
@
@n1t

Kt+3
Zt+2

=
2(1  )Kt+3
n1tZt+2
;
and similarly,
@
@n1t

Kt+4
Zt+3

=
2(1  )Kt+4
n1tZt+3
@
@n1t

Kt+5
Zt+4

=
2(1  )2Kt+5
n1tZt+4
for all future time periods. Therefore, substituting the above expressions into the expression
for {n1t} we get
1
1  nt + 
2t+2

2(1  )Kt+3
n1tZt+2

+ 3t+3

2(1  )Kt+4
n1tZt+3

+ ::: =
t2Yt(1  )
n1t
:
Recall that for every t, 1
Ct
= t: Since  = 1; It+j =
Kt+1+j
Zt+j
; for all j = 0: This gives us the
nal expression of the FOC for n1t, as shown in equation (12)
fn1tg : 1
1  nt +
22(1  )
n1t
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
Ct+j+2
=
2Yt(1  )
Ctn1t
:
The FOC with respect to n2t is given by
fn2tg :  11 nt +
t3Yt(1 )
n2t
 t @@n2t (
Kt+1
Zt
) t+1 @@n2t (
Kt+2
Zt+1
) 2t+2 @@n2t (
Kt+3
Zt+2
)::: = 0: Given
@Zt
@n2t
= 0;
@Zt+1
@n2t
=
Zt+1
n2t
;
@Zt+2
@n2t
=
Zt+2
Zt+1
Zt+1
n2t
  3(1  )Zt+2
n2t
this means a change in n2 on Z has two e¤ects - a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect. The
expression, Zt+2
Zt+1
Zt+1
n2t
; is the direct e¤ect, while the expression,  3(1 )Zt+2n2t ; is the indirect
e¤ect. Therefore,
@Zt+2
@n2t
= (   3(1  ))Zt+2
n2t
:
2
Similarly, the derivative of Z with respect to n2 at time period t+ 3 is
@Zt+3
@n2t
= (   3(1  ))Zt+3
n2t
:
Hence, for any future time period t+ j + 2, the derivative is as follows
@Zt+j+2
@n2t
= j(   3(1  ))Zt+j+2
n2t
:
Substituting the above expressions into the above expression for fn2tg, we get
 1
1  nt +
t3Yt(1  )
n2t
+ t+1
Kt+2
Z2t+1
Zt+1
n2t
+ 2t+2
Kt+3
Z2t+2
(   3(1  ))Zt+2
n2t
+ ::: = 0:
Again, for every t, 1
Ct
= t: Since  = 1; It+j =
Kt+1+j
Zt+j
; for all j = 0: This implies that
 1
1  nt +
t3Yt(1  )
n2t
+ 
t+1Kt+2
Zt+1n2t
+
2(   3(1  ))
n2t
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
Ct+j+2
= 0:
Hence the nal expression for {n2t} is as follows and as shown in equation (13)
fn2tg : 1
1  nt =
3Yt(1  )
Ctn2t
+ 
It+1
Ct+1n2t
+
2(   3(1  ))
n2t
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
Ct+j+2
:
Appendix B: Decision rules for the planners problem for the base-
line model
We rst show that , x and n are constants, and have feasible values. Feasibility requires
that 0 < ; x; n < 1: We also derive a condition that ensures that the balanced growth rate
is stable, i.e.,
gzt+1 = gzt = gz:
We have shown earlier
{Kt+1}: 1CtZt = 
1Yt+1(1 )
Ct+1Kt+1
+ 2 It+2
Ct+2Kt+1
(1  )(1  ) + 3(1 )((1 ) 1)
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+3
Ct+j+3
) 1
Yt(1 )Zt = 
1Yt+1(1 )
Yt+1(1 )(1 )Yt(1 )Zt+
2 (1 )
(1 )Yt(1 )Zt (1 )(1 )+
3(1 )((1 ) 1)
(1 )Yt(1 )Zt (
1
1  )
(1 )

3
) (1  ) = 1(1  )
(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]
)  = (1  )[1  
2(1  )(1  )  1]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]
(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]
;
as shown in (19).
For 0 <  < 1; we require that
(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )  1]  3(1  )[(1  )  1] > 0
and
1   > 0)  < 1

:
Note that,  < 1

; is the condition for stability. From the FOC for n1t;
fn1tg : 1
1  nt +
22(1  )
n1t
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
Ct+j+2
=
2Yt(1  )
Ctn1t
) nt
1  nt =
2
x
  
22(1  )(1  )
x(1  )
) n = 2[(1  )  
2(1  )(1  )]
(2 + x)(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
which is the expression in equation (17), and  is derived above. Note, when
2[(1  )  2(1  )(1  )] > 0
and when
0 < ; x < 1;
then
0 < n < 1:
Next, we derive the expression for x:We know the FOC with respect to fn2tg is given by
1
1 nt =
3Yt(1 )
Ctn2t
+  It+1
Ct+1n2t
+ 2(   3(1  ))
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
Ct+j+2
) (1  x)

n1
1 nt

= 3

+ 
 
1 


+ 2(   3(1  ))

1
1 
  
1 


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)

1  x
x

=
3(1  ) + (1  )(1  ) + 2(   3(1  ))(1  )
2(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
) x = 2(1  )  
22(1  )(1  )
[2 + 3 + (1  )](1  ) + 2(1  )[   3(1  )  2(1  )]
which is the expression for x in equation (20). When 0 <  < 1, 0 < x < 1 is automatically
satised. This means feasible values of x require no other additional assumption other than
0 <  < 1: We rst verify that 0 <  < 1: This means we need to check whether the
following two inequalities are satised:
(i)(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )  1]  3(1  )[(1  )  1] > 0
(ii)1   > 0)  < 1

:
Since 0 <  < 1; we have 0 <  < 1 < 1

: This means (ii) is trivially satised when 0 <  < 1:
To check (i), we must check whether (1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )  1]  3(1  )[(1 
)  1] > 0; or (1  )(1  1)  2(1  )(1    1) > 0;
) (1  )(1  1) > 2(1  )(1    1):
We know (1 1) > (1  1) because 0 <  < 1: Further, (1 ) > 2(1  ) if and
only if (1 ) 2(1 ) > 0: Clearly, (1 )(1+ ) > 0: Hence, (1 ) 2(1 ) > 0:
This implies
(1  )(1  1)  2(1  )(1    1) > 0:
Hence, (i) is satised and 0 <  < 1. We now verify that 0 < x < 1:We know that
x =
2(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
[2 + 3 + (1  )](1  ) + 2(1  )[   3(1  )  2(1  )]
:
To show the above expression for 0 < x < 1; it is su¢ cient to show that 2[(1  ) 
2(1   )(1   )] > 0, since we have already shown, 0 <  < 1: We also have to show the
denominator in the above expression is greater than the numerator so as to ensure that x is
a fraction. As shown earlier,
(1  )  2(1  ) > 0
which implies (1  )  2(1  )(1 ) > 0 since we have already shown 0 <  < 1 (and
5
so 0 < (1   ) < 1). This implies that, 2[(1   )   2(1   )(1   )] > 0 is true. The
denominator is given by the expression
[2 + 3 + (1  )](1  ) + 2(1  )[   3(1  )  2(1  )];
which on re-arranging yields 2[(1 ) 2(1 )(1 )]+3[(1 ) 2(1 )(1 )]+
(1 )(1 )+2(1 ):We earlier showed that, 2[(1 ) 2(1 )(1 )] > 0:
Similarly, we can obtain
3[(1  )  2(1  )(1  )] > 0:
Also,
(1  )(1  ) + 2(1  ) > 0
follows from above and the restriction that (1  ) > 0: Hence the denominator of x is the
numerator plus a sum of two positive terms. This shows that 0 < x < 1.
Finally, we need to check that 0 < n < 1: Recall that,
n =
2[(1  )  2(1  )(1  )]
(2 + x)(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
:
This means if we just show the numerator is greater than zero, 0 < n < 1 is true. This
is because the denominator is simply the numerator + x(1   ): From above, this term
(x(1 )) is positive. We have also seen that 2[(1 ) 2(1  )(1 )] > 0: Hence,
0 < n < 1 is true.
Therefore, 0 < ; x; n < 1.
Appendix C : Balanced Growth Rates
In the planner version,
Zt+1 = B((1  m)n2t)Zt
(
Gt
Yt 1

Kt
Yt 1
1 )(1 )
:
Since under full depreciation Kt = It 1Zt 1 and Gt = I
g
t 1Zt 1; we can substitute for G and
K in the law of motion and further substitute the decision rules for I and Ig; leading to
It = (1  )Yt(1  )
6
and
Igt = Yt:
Further,
n2 = (1  x)n:
Hence,
Zt+1 = B((1  m)(1  x)n)Zt
(
Yt 1Zt 1
Yt 1

(1  )Yt 1(1  )Zt 1
Yt 1
1 )(1 )
) Zt+1 = cMZt Z(1 )t 1 f()(1  )1 g(1 )
where cM = B((1  m)(1  x)n)(1  )(1 )(1 )
is a constant. This implies
Zt+1
Zt
= gzt+1 = cMZ 1t
Z 1t 1
Z
(1 )+ 1
t 1 f()(1  )1 g(1 )
) gzt+1 = g (1 )zt cMf()(1  )1 g(1 ):
The assumption 0 <  < 1, makes the system dened by
gzt+1 =


g
(1 )
zt
(where 
 = cMf()(1   )1 g(1 ) is a constant) dynamically stable. Any deviation from
the point of intersection of the 45-degree line with the plot for gzt+1 =


g
(1 )
zt
will eventually
result in the system converging to the 45-degree line. This is shown in Figure [1]. Note
that (1   ) = 1 will give an oscillating system which will never ever converge. Likewise
(1  ) > 1 will lead to an explosive system. In our model, it is therefore su¢ cient to have
0 <  < 1 to ensure a steady state BGP.
At the steady state therefore,
gzt+1 = gzt = bgz
and hence, bgz = 
 11+(1 ) = [cMf()(1  )1 g(1 )] 12 
is the steady state growth rate, where cM = B((1 m)(1 x)n)(1 )(1 )(1 ) is a constant.
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To derive the growth rates of the other variables on the BGP, note that
Kt+1 = ItZt
) Kt+1
Kt
=
ItZt
It 1Zt 1
) bgk = (1  )Yt(1  )Zt
(1  )Yt 1(1  )Zt 1 =
YtZt
Yt 1Zt 1
= bgy bgz:
Now,
Yt = AK
1
t n
2
1t (mn2t)
3
) Yt
Yt 1
= bgy = AK1t n21t (mn2t)3
AK1t 1n
2
1t 1(mn2t 1)3
=
K1t
K1t 1
= bgk1
) bgy = bgk1
) bgy = bgk1 = bgz 11 1 :
Appendix D - Optimal tax rate in the baseline model - the planners
problem
@ bgz
@
=
@[cMf()(1  )1 g(1 )] 12 
@
= 0
) cM 1(2 ) (1  )
(2  ) [()
(1  )1 ]  1(2 ) @[()
(1  )1 ]
@
= 0
) (1  )1 () 1 = ()(1  )(1  ) 
) (1  ) = ()(1  )
) b = :
Hence the steady state growth optimizing tax rate in the planner version is b = :
Appendix E - Optimal tax rate in the baseline model - the agents
version
fng : @cgz
@n
=
@[cMf(1 )()1 g(1 )] 1(2 )
@n
= 0
) cM 1(2 ) (1  )
(2  ) [(1 )
()1 ]
 1
(2 )
@[[(1 )()1 ]]
@n
= 0
) ()1 (1 ) 1@[(1 )]
@n
+ (1 )(1  )() @[()]
@n
= 0:
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Since
@[(1 )]
@n
=
@[(2 + 3)(n) + 1( k)]
@n
= 2 + 3;
@[()]
@n
=
@[(2 + 3)(1  n) + 1(1   k)]
@n
=  (2 + 3):
Substituting the above expressions yields,
) ()1 (1 ) 1   (1 )(1  )()  = 0
) 
1   =
1 

) \1  = :
Likewise
f kg : @cgz
@ k
=
@[cMf(1 )()1 g(1 )] 1(2 )
@ k
= 0:
Since
@[(1 )]
@ k
=
@[(2 + 3)(n) + 1( k)]
@ k
= 1;
@[()]
@ k
=
@[(2 + 3)(1  n) + 1(1   k)]
@ k
=  (1):
Substituting the above yields the same FOCs just as in the case of fng: This implies, both
{ng and { kg give the same FOC
\1  = 
) (2 + 3)(cn) + 1( b k) =  = b :
Appendix F - Comparative statics - the planners problem
We know from equations (17) and (19)
n =
2[(1  )  2(1  )(1  )]
(2 + x)(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
:
And
 =
(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )  1]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]
(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]
:
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Further b = :
We shall rst see how  changes with . This implies, the relationship between 1    and
 gets reversed.
@
@
=
@
@

(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )  1]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]
(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]

=
@
@

1  1(1  )
(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]

=
1(1  )
f(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]g2

@f(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]g
@
=
1(1  )[(1  )2(1  ) + 3(1  )]
f(1  )[1  2(1  )(1  )]  3(1  )[(1  )  1]g2
> 0:
Hence
@
@
> 0;
and therefore
@(1  )
@
< 0:
Since
Ct = Yt(1  )
) @Ct
@
< 0:
Now we take the partial derivative of
x =
2(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
[2 + 3 + (1  )](1  ) + 2(1  )[   3(1  )  2(1  )]
with respect to : We will use @
@
> 0 in our analysis. Suppose we consider the value of 1
x
;
1
x
= 1 +
3(1  )  23(1  )(1  )
2(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
+
(1  )
2(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
) @
 
1
x

@
=
@
@

3(1  )  23(1  )(1  )
2(1  )  22(1  )(1  )

+
@
@

(1  )
2(1  )  22(1  )(1  )

:
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On opening up the brackets and simplifying the above expression, we get
) @
 
1
x

@
=
2(1  ) @@(1  )
(2(1  )  22(1  )(1  ))2
< 0
because
@
@
> 0 and so
@(1  )
@
< 0:
Hence,
@
 
1
x

@
< 0
@ (x)
@
> 0:
We now look at the partial derivative of n with respect to . We have shown earlier that
n =
2[(1  )  2(1  )(1  )]
(2 + x)(1  )  22(1  )(1  )
:
Hence, on applying the quotient rule and on re-arranging the terms, we get
@
@
(n) =
[2
2(1  )x(1  )]@
@
[2(1  )  22(1  )(1  ) + x(1  )]2
  [2(1  )  2
2(1  )(1  )](1  ) @x
@
[2(1  )  22(1  )(1  ) + x(1  )]2
  [2(1  )  2
2(1  )(1  )](1  )x@
@
[2(1  )  22(1  )(1  ) + x(1  )]2
:
Given that @x
@
> 0 we can easily see that the second term in the above expression
  [2(1  )  2
2(1  )(1  )](1  ) @x
@
[2(1  )  22(1  )(1  ) + x(1  )]2
< 0:
This is because from an earlier exercise we have shown that 2(1 ) 22(1 )(1 ) >
11
0: Clubbing the other two terms, we get,
@
@
(n) =
 2x[(1  )2   2(1  )(1  )  2(1  )(1  )(1  )]@@
[2(1  )  22(1  )(1  ) + x(1  )]2
  [2(1  )  2
2(1  )(1  )](1  ) @x
@
[2(1  )  22(1  )(1  ) + x(1  )]2
:
If [(1  )2  2(1  )(1  )  2(1  )(1  )(1 )] > 0 then @n
@
< 0: To see this,
we re-arrange
[(1  )2   2(1  )(1  )  2(1  )(1  )(1  )]
to get
(1  )[(1  )  2(1  )  2(1  )(1  )]
which is equal to
(1  )(1  )[1   + ] > 0
because we have shown earlier that [1     2(1  )] > 0. Hence
@n
@
< 0:
We now need to verify whether, @n1
@
< 0: Note that
@
@
(n1) =
@
@
(xn) = x
@
@
(n) + n
@
@
(x);
the sign of which is ambiguous because x is increasing in  while n is decreasing in .
Therefore whichever term dominates will determine the way n1 behaves with : However we
can show
@
@
(n2) < 0;
since
@
@
(n2) =
@
@
((1  x)n) = (1  x) @
@
(n) + n
@
@
(1  x) < 0:
Appendix G: Welfare analysis
In the planners problem, we know
Ct = Yt(1  )
12
) Ct
Ct 1
=
Yt(1  )
Yt 1(1  ) = bgy
) bgc = bgy:
Since bgc is a constant, Ct = C0 bgct: On the BGP, the supply of labor is the same across time.
We denote welfare by ; where,
 =
1P
j=0
t[logCt + log(1  nt)]
 =
1P
j=0
t logCt +
log(1  bn)
1  
)  = logCo +  logC1 + 2 logC2 + 3 logC3 + 4 logC4 + :::::::::+ log(1 bn)1 
)  = logCo
1   +
2
1   log bgc + log(1  bn)1  
)  = logCo
1  +
21
(1 )(1 1) log[
cMf()(1  )1 g(1 )] 12  + log(1 bn)
1 
)  = log(Yo(1 ))
1  +
21
(1 )(1 1) log[
cMf()(1  )1 g(1 )] 12  + log(1 bn)
1 
)  = log(Yo)
1  +
log(1 )
1  +
21
(1 )(1 1) log[
cMf()(1  )1 g(1 )] 12  + log(1 bn)
1 
)  =   +  log(1  ) + 	 log[()(1  )1 ];
where   is independent of the tax rate and
	 =
21(1  )
(1  )(1  1)(2  ) ; and  =
1
1   :
On di¤erentiating the above welfare function, we get
w =
2(1  )
2(1  ) + (1  )(2  ) :
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In the agents version, we denote welfare by :
 =
1P
j=0
t[logCt + log(1  bn)]
)  =
1P
j=0
t logCt +
log(1  bn)
1  
=
logCo
1   +
2
1   log bgc+ log(1  bn)1  
)  = log(Yo)
1   +
log 
1   +
21
(1  )(1  1) log[
cMf(1 )()1 g(1 )] 12  + log(1  bn)
1  
)  =  +  log  + 	 log[(1 )()1 ];
where  is independent of the tax rates and
	 =
21(1  )
(1  )(1  1)(2  ) ; and  =
1
1   :
Appendix H - The model with administrative costs: growth opti-
mization in planners version
bgz = [B((1  m)(1  x)(n))(1  )(1 )(1 )f(   c)(1  )1 g(1 )] 12 
) @cgz
@
=
@[f(   c)(1  )1 g] (1 )(2 )
@
= 0
) (   c)@(1  )
1 
@
+ (1  )1 @(   c
)
@
= 0
)  (1  )(   c)(1  )  + (1  )1 (   c) 1(1  c 1) = 0
) (1   AC)[1   c(AC) 1] = (1   )(AC   c(AC)) as shown in equation (42).
Substituting c = 0, we get
(1  AC) = (1  )AC
) AC = :
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Substituting  = 1
(1  AC)[1  c] = (1  )(AC   cAC)
) (1  AC) = (1  )AC
) AC = :
Appendix I - The model with administrative costs: growth opti-
mization in the agents version
We have,
bgz = [B((1  m)(1  x)(n))(1  )(1 )(1 )f(1   c1k   c2n)()1 g(1 )] 12 
where 1  = 1 k + (1  1)n: Substituting for (1  ) in bgz we get,bgz = [B((1   m)(1   x)(n))(1   )(1 )(1 )f(1 k + (1   1)n   c1k   c2n)(1  
1 k   (1  1)n)1 g(1 )]
1
2  :
The FOC of bgz with respect to n is given by
fng : @cgz
@n
= 0
) @f(1 k + (1  1)n   c1

k   c2n)(1  1 k   (1  1)n)1 g
@n
= 0
) (1   c1k   c2n) @(1 1k (1 1)n)
1 
@n
+ ()1  @(1k+(1 1)n c1

k c2n)
@n
= 0
) (1  1   c2 1n )() = (1  1)(1  )(1   c1k   c2n): (1)
Similarly, the FOC with respect to  k is given by
f kg : @cgz
@ k
= 0
) @f(1 k + (1  1)n   c1

k   c2n)(1  1 k   (1  1)n)1 g
@ k
= 0
) (1   c1k   c2n)
@()1 
@ k
+ ()1 
@(1   c1k   c2n)
@ k
= 0
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) (1   c1 1k )() = 1(1  )(1   c1k   c2n): (2)
Using FOC (a) and FOC (b), we have
(1  1   c2 1n )()
(1   c1 1k )()
=
(1  1)(1  )(1   c1k   c2n)
1(1  )(1   c1k   c2n)
) (1  1   c2
 1
n )
(1   c1 1k )
=
(1  1)
1
) 1(1  1   c2 1n ) = (1  1)(1   c1 1k )
) 1c2 1n = (1  1)c1 1k
) 
 1
n
 1k
=
(1  1)c1
1c2
)

n
 k
 1
=

1  1
1

c1
c2

as shown in equation (48). We now summarize the results for linear administrative costs.
The following is the FOC with respect to n
fng : (1  1   c2 1n )() = (1  1)(1  )(1   c1k   c2n)
and the following is the FOC with respect to  k
f kg : (1   c1 1k )() = 1(1  )(1   c1k   c2n):
Substituting  = 1, we now get the following as the FOCs with respect to n and  k
respectively
fng : (1  1   c2)() = (1  1)(1  )(1   c1 k   c2n)
f kg : (1   c1)() = 1(1  )(1   c1 k   c2n):
This suggests that there does not exist any unique solution to the combination of tax rates
on labor and capital.
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Appendix J - The Agents Version - solved as a borrowing-lending
problem
The Firms Problem
The rms value function is given by
Max
Kt+1;n1t;n2t
V (kt; Zt) = fAK1n21t (mn2t)3 wt(n1t+n2t)g(1  k) 
Kt+1
Zt
+

1
1 + r

V (kt+1; Zt+1):
The FOC with respect to Kt+1 is as follows:
fKt+1g :  1
Zt
+

1
1 + r

1Yt+1(1   k)
Kt+1
+

1
1 + r

  @
@Kt+1
(
Kt+3
Zt+2
) 

1
1 + r

@
@Kt+1
(
Kt+4
Zt+3
)  ::

= 0:
Note that
@Zt
@Kt+1
=
@Zt+1
@Kt+1
= 0,
@Zt+2
@Kt+1
= (1 )(1 )Zt+2
Kt+1
,
@Zt+3
@Kt+1
=
Zt+3
Zt+2
@Zt+2
@Kt+1
 1(1 )Zt+3
Kt+1
:
We therefore have
@Zt+3
@Kt+1
= (1  )Zt+3
Kt+1
((1  )  1):
And hence for any other future time period,
@Zt+3+j
@Kt+1
= j(1  )Zt+3+j
Kt+1
[(1  )  1]; forj = 0:
Therefore, substituting the above values in {Kt+1}, and since  = 1; It+j =
Kt+1+j
Zt+j
; for all
j = 0: This implies
fKt+1g : 1
Zt
=

1
1 + r
264 1Yt+1(1 k)Kt+1 +
 
1
1+r

(1  )(1  )

It+2
Kt+1

+
 
1
1+r
2
(1  )[(1  )  1]
1P
j=0
 

1+r
j It+j+3
Kt+1
375 :
The FOC with respect to n1t is as follows:
fn1tg : 2Yt(1   k)
n1t
 wt(1  k)+

1
1 + r

  @
@n1t
(
Kt+3
Zt+2
) 

1
1 + r

@
@n1t
(
Kt+4
Zt+3
)  ::

= 0
Note that
@Zt
@n1t
=
@Zt+1
@n1t
= 0,
@Zt+2
@n1t
=  (1  )2Zt+2
n1t
,
@Zt+3
@n1t
=
Zt+3
Zt+2
@Zt+2
@n1t
and so on.
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Therefore, substituting the above expressions (and  = 1; It+j =
Kt+1+j
Zt+j
; for all j = 0) into
the expression for {n1t} we get
fn1tg : wt(1   k) = 2Yt(1   k)
n1t
 

1
1 + r
2 
(1  )2
n1t
 1P
j=0


1 + r
j
It+j+2:
The FOC with respect to n2t is given by
fn2tg :  wt(1  k)+3Yt(1   k)
n2t
+

1
1 + r

  @
@n2t
(
Kt+2
Zt+1
) 

1
1 + r

@
@n2t
(
Kt+3
Zt+2
)  ::

= 0
Given
@Zt
@n2t
= 0;
@Zt+1
@n2t
=
Zt+1
n2t
;
@Zt+2
@n2t
=
Zt+2
Zt+1
Zt+1
n2t
  3(1  )Zt+2
n2t
= [   3(1  )]Zt+2
n2t
and
@Zt+2+j
@n2t
= j[   3(1  )]Zt+2+j
n2t
;8j  0 and so on.
Substituting the above expressions into the above expression for fn2tg, we get
fn2tg : wt(1   k) = 3Yt(1   k)
n2t
+


1 + r

It+1
n2t
+
[   3(1  )]
(1 + r)2n2t
1P
j=0


1 + r
j
It+j+2:
The Agents Problem
The agent is modelled as solving a borrowing-lending problem, as follows
Max
1X
t=0
t [log ct + log(1  nt]
subject to
at+1 = (1 + r)at + wt(n1t + n2t)(1  n)  ct:
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The following are the FOCs
fctg : 1
ct
= t; where t is the Lagrangian multiplier
fat+1g : (1 + r)
ct+1
= ct
fn1tg : wt(1  n)
ct
=
1
1  nt
fn2tg : wt(1  n)
ct
=
1
1  nt
In equilibrium,
at = Kt: 8t
Now, the rms FOC fKt+1g :
fKt+1g : 1
Zt
=

1
1 + r
264 1Yt+1(1 k)Kt+1 +
 
1
1+r

(1  )(1  )

It+2
Kt+1

+
 
1
1+r
2
(1  )[(1  )  1]
1P
j=0
 

1+r
j It+j+3
Kt+1
375 :
Substituting for (1 + r) from fat+1g
1
Zt
=
ct
ct+1

1Yt+1(1   k)
Kt+1

+
ct
ct+1
ct+1
ct+2
(1  )(1  )

It+2
Kt+1

+
ct
ct+1
ct+1
ct+2
ct+2
(1  )[(1  )  1]
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+3
ct+j+3
:
This implies
fKt+1g : 1
ctZt
=
1Yt+1(1   k)
ct+1Kt+1
+
2(1  )(1  )
Kt+1

It+2
ct+2

+
3(1  )[(1  )  1]
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+3
ct+j+3
:
The rms FOC fn1tg :
fn1tg : wt(1   k) = 2Yt(1   k)
n1t
 

1
1 + r
2 
(1  )2
n1t
 1P
j=0


1 + r
j
It+j+2:
Substituting for the FOC fn1tg from the agents problem, we get
fn1tg : 1
1  nt =
2Yt(1  n)
ctn1t
  2

2(1  )(1  n)
n1t(1   k)
 1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
ct+j+2
:
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Likewise,
fn2tg : 1
1  nt =
3Yt(1  n)
ctn2t
+


n2t

It+1
ct+1
(1  n)
(1   k)+
2[   3(1  )]
n2t
(1  n)
(1   k)
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
ct+j+2
:
Hence we can summarize the required FOCs as follows
fKt+1g : 1
ctZt
=
1Yt+1(1   k)
ct+1Kt+1
+
2(1  )(1  )
Kt+1

It+2
ct+2

+
3(1  )[(1  )  1]
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+3
ct+j+3
fn1tg : 1
1  nt =
2Yt(1  n)
ctn1t
  2

2(1  )(1  n)
n1t(1   k)
 1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
ct+j+2
fn2tg : 1
1  nt =
3Yt(1  n)
ctn2t
+


n2t

It+1
ct+1
(1  n)
(1   k) +
2[   3(1  )]
n2t
(1  n)
(1   k)
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
ct+j+2
:
It is easy to see that n =  k =  gives us the planners version.
The Decision Rules
We will now derive the decision rules from the above FOCs. The following are the decision
rules which we will derive using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients.
ct = AYt; where AYt, is the after tax income accruing to agents
it = (1  )AYt
n1t = xnt
n2t = (1  x)nt
nt = n that is, labor supply turns out to be constant
We will also consider the following
fYt   wt(n1t + n2t)g(1   k) + wt(n1t + n2t)(1  n) = AYt:
Substituting for wt from the rms FOCs fn1tg and fn2tg,h
Yt   2Yt   3Yt + 2(1 )
2AYt
(1 k)(1 )
 
1 

  AYt
(1 k)
 
1 

  2[ 3(1 )]AYt
(1 k)(1 )
 
1 

i
(1  k)
+
h
2Yt + 3Yt   2(1 )
2AYt
(1 k)(1 )
 
1 


+ AYt
(1 k)
 
1 


+ 
2[ 3(1 )]AYt
(1 k)(1 )
 
1 

i
(1 n) =
AYt
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) (1   k)Yt
h
1 +
2(1 )2A(1 )
(1 k)(1 )  
A(1 )
(1 k)  
2[ 3(1 )](1 )A
(1 k)(1 )
i
+
h
(1  1)  2(1 )
2A(1 )
(1 k)(1 ) +
A(1 )
(1 k) +
2[ 3(1 )](1 )A
(1 k)(1 )
i
Yt(1  n) = AYt:
This gives us
Yt
"
1(1   k) + (1  1)(1  n) + 2(1 )
2A(1 )(n k)
(1 k)(1 )  
A(1 )(n k)
(1 k)
 2[ 3(1 )](1 )A(n k)
(1 k)(1 )
#
= AYt;
which means
A =

1(1   k) + (1  1)(1  n) + (n    k)A(1  )
(1   k)(1  ) f(1  1)(1  )   g

:
We will now derive decision rules for consumption and investment. From the FOC of
fKt+1g
fKt+1g : 1
ctZt
=
1Yt+1(1   k)
ct+1Kt+1
+
2(1  )(1  )
Kt+1

It+2
ct+2

+
3(1  )[(1  )  1]
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+3
ct+j+3
:
This implies,
1
AYtZt
=
1Yt+1(1   k)
AYt+1(1  )AYtZt +
2(1  )(1  )
(1  )AYtZt

1  


+
3(1  )[(1  )  1]
(1  )AYtZt(1  )

1  


:
This gives us
) (1  ) = 1(1  )(1   k)
A[(1  )  2(1  )(1  ) + 13(1  )]
: (3)
And hence expressions for consumption and investments follow. Substituting this back
into the expression for A,
A = 1(1   k) + (1  1)(1  n) + (n    k)A(1  )
(1   k)(1  ) f(1  1)(1  )   g
= 1(1   k) + (1  1)(1  n) + 1
2(1  )(1   k)(n    k)[(1  1)(1  )   ]
(1   k)(1  )[(1  )  2(1  )(1  ) + 13(1  )]
= 1(1   k) + (1  1)(1  n) + 1
2(n    k)[(1  1)(1  )   ]
[(1  )  2(1  )(1  ) + 13(1  )]
:
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Clearly, when n =  k = 
A = [1(1   k) + (1  1)(1  n)]
= (1  ):
We will now derive decision rules for labor supply and the way it is distributed between
n1 and n2. Using the following FOCs fn1tg and fn2tg
fn1tg : 1
1  nt =
2Yt(1  n)
ctn1t
  2

2(1  )(1  n)
n1t(1   k)
 1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
ct+j+2
fn2tg : 1
1  nt =
3Yt(1  n)
ctn2t
+


n2t

It+1
ct+1
(1  n)
(1   k) +
2[   3(1  )]
n2t
(1  n)
(1   k)
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
ct+j+2
and the denitions
n1t = xnt
n2t = (1  x)nt
nt = n that is, labor supply turns out to be constant
and the decision rules for consumption and investments, we get
fn1tg : xn
1  n =
2Yt(1  n)
AYt
  2

2(1  )(1  n)
(1   k)(1  )

1  


) xn
1  n =
2(1  n)
A
  2

2(1  )(1  n)
(1   k)(1  )

1  


) xn
1  n =
2(1  n)(1   k)(1  )  22(1  )(1  n)A(1  )
A(1   k)(1  )
) n
1  n =
2(1  n)(1   k)(1  )  22(1  )(1  n)A(1  )
xA(1   k)(1  )
This implies
) n = 2(1  n)(1   k)(1  )  
22(1  )(1  n)(1  )A
2(1  n)(1   k)(1  )  22(1  )(1  n)(1  )A+ xA(1   k)(1  )
:
(4)
From the FOC fn2tg
fn2tg : (1  x)n
1  n =
3Yt(1  n)
AYt
+

1  


(1  n)
(1   k)+
2[   3(1  )](1  n)
(1   k)(1  )

1  


22
) (1  x)[2(1  n)(1   k)(1  )  
22(1  )(1  n)A(1  )]
xA(1   k)(1  )
=
3(1  n)(1   k)(1  ) + (1  )(1  n)A(1  ) + A2[   3(1  )](1  )(1  n)
A(1   k)(1  ) :
This implies
) 1 x
x
= 3(1 n)(1 k)(1 )+(1 )(1 n)A(1 )+A
2[ 3(1 )](1 )(1 n)
2(1 n)(1 k)(1 ) 22(1 )(1 n)A(1 )
which gives us
) x = 2(1 n)(1 k)(1 ) 22(1 )(1 n)A(1 )
(2+3)[(1 n)(1 k)(1 ) 2(1 )(1 n)A(1 )]+(1 n)(1 )A(1 )+A2(1 n)(1 ) :
This implies
x =
2(1  n)(1   k)(1  )  22(1  )(1  n)A(1  )
(2 + 3)[(1  n)(1   k)(1  )  2(1  )(1  n)A(1  )] + (1  n)(1  )A
:
(5)
The expressions for n1 and n2 follow.
Appendix K: The Model without n2 in production
The Firms Problem
The rms value function
Max
Kt+1;n1t;n2t
V (kt; Zt) = fAKt n1 1t   wt(n1t + n2t)g(1   k) 
Kt+1
Zt
+

1
1 + r

V (kt+1; Zt+1)
where,
Zt+1 = BZ

t n

2t
"
Gt
Yt 1

Kt
Yt 1
1 #1 
The nal expressions for the FOCs are as follows:
fKt+1g : 1
Zt
=

1
1 + r
264 Yt+1(1 k)Kt+1 +
 
1
1+r

(1  )(1  )

It+2
Kt+1

+
 
1
1+r
2
(1  )[(1  )  ]
1P
j=0
 

1+r
j It+j+3
Kt+1
375 :
fn1tg : wt(1   k) = (1  )Yt(1   k)
n1t
 

1
1 + r
2 
(1  )(1  )
n1t
 1P
j=0


1 + r
j
It+j+2:
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fn2tg : wt(1   k) =


1 + r

1
n2t
 1P
j=0


1 + r
j
It+j+1:
The Agents Problem
The agent is modelled as solving a borrowing-lending problem similar to Appendix J:
Max
1X
t=0
t [log ct + log(1  nt]
subject to
at+1 = (1 + r)at + wt(n1t + n2t)(1  n)  ct:
Solving the FOCs the same way as done in Appendix J, we can summarize them as
follows
fKt+1g : 1
ctZt
=
Yt+1(1   k)
ct+1Kt+1
+
2(1  )(1  )
Kt+1

It+2
ct+2

+
3(1  )[(1  )  ]
Kt+1
1P
j=0
jj
It+j+3
ct+j+3
fn1tg : 1
1  nt =
(1  )Yt(1  n)
n1t
  2

(1  )(1  )(1  n)
n1t(1   k)
 1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
ct+j+2
fn2tg : 1
1  nt =


n2t

1  n
1   k
 1P
j=0
jj
It+j+1
ct+j+1
:
It is again easy to see that n =  k =  gives us the planners version.
The Decision Rules
We will now derive the decision rules from the above FOCs. The following are the decision
rules which we will derive using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients.
ct = AYt; where AYt, is the after tax income accruing to agents
it = (1  )AYt
n1t = xnt
n2t = (1  x)nt
nt = n that is, labor supply turns out to be constant.
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We will also consider the following
fYt   wt(n1t + n2t)g(1   k) + wt(n1t + n2t)(1  n) = AYt:
Solving for the above decision rules, we get
(1  ) = (1  )(1   k)
A[(1  )  2(1  )(1  ) + 3(1  )] :
A = (1   k) + (1  )(1  n) + (n    k)
(1   k)(1  )A (1  ) [(1  )   ]
= (1   k) + (1  )(1  n) + 
2(1  )(1   k)(n    k)[(1  )   ]
(1   k)(1  )[(1  )  2(1  )(1  ) + 3(1  )]
= (1   k) + (1  )(1  n) + 
2(n    k)[(1  )   ]
[(1  )  2(1  )(1  ) + 3(1  )]
Clearly, when n =  k = 
A = [(1   k) + (1  )(1  n)]
= 1   :
The decision rules for total labor supply and the way it is distributed between n1 and n2
can be derived from the following FOCs,
fn1tg : 1
1  nt =
(1  )Yt(1  n)
ctn1t
  2

(1  )(1  )(1  n)
n1t(1   k)
 1P
j=0
jj
It+j+2
ct+j+2
fn2tg : 1
1  nt =


n2t

1  n
1   k
 1P
j=0
jj
It+j+1
ct+j+1
;
with the following denitions
n1t = xnt
n2t = (1  x)nt
nt = n that is, labor supply turns out to be constant
as follows
n =
(1  )(1  n)(1   k)(1  )  2(1  )(1  )(1  n)(1  )A
(1  )(1  n)(1   k)(1  )  2(1  )(1  )(1  n)(1  )A+ xA(1   k)(1  )
:
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The expression for x is given by
x =
[(1  )(1   k)(1  )  2(1  )(1  )(1  )A]
[(1  )(1   k)(1  )  2(1  )(1  )(1  )A] + (1  )A
:
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